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RECENT DECISIONS
a century legislation and judicial precedent have avoided the duplica-
tion of remedies.26 In line with this policy, he indicated his approval
of some plan, similar to workmen's compensation, which would make
veterans compensation the exclusive remedy.27  This is the only logi-
cal and consistent solution to the problem. 28  The allowance of con-
current remedies results at best in unnecessary complication and
confusion and, at worst, in duplication. It is submitted that the situ-
ation can only be corrected by legislative action.
X
TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH - MAINTENANCE OF ACTION
AGAINST NEGLIGENT SOLE BENEFICIARY ALLoWED.-In an action
for wrongful death, plaintiff-administratrix sued decedent's negligent
husband, who was the sole statutory beneficiary of the decedent. The
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred
as a matter of law. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that, although a negligent sole statutory
beneficiary is precluded from sharing in any recovery, the action could
be maintained in view of the statutory provision for deduction, before
distribution, of the cost of recovery and the expenses of administra-
tion, burial, and last sickness. Pike v. Adams, 108 A.2d 55 (N.H.
1954).
Wrongful death statutes, although a great improvement over the
common law,' nevertheless present many problems,2 not the least of
which is the status of the negligent sole beneficiary.3  Some jurisdic-
26Id. at 104-105.
27 Id. at 107 n.14. For a comparison between veterans compensation and
workmen's compensation, see Note, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 90, 98-101 (1951).
28 "This Act, however, should be construed to -fit, so far as will comport
with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies against the Gov-
ernment to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole." Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
1 At common law there could be no action for trespass when a felonious
act was included in the res gestae. Since homicide was presumably a felony,
no civil action could be maintained against one who negligently caused the
death of another. The numerous railway accidents of the middle nineteenth
century brought to light the harsh effects of this lack of remedy. See PoLLocK,
ToRTs 54 (15th ed., Landon, 1951). The resulting dissatisfaction culminated
in the passage in 1846 of Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act, 1846,
9 & 10 VIcr., c. 93), after which the great majority of American death statutes
are patterned. See PRossER, TORTS 955-956 (1941).
2 See PRossER, ToRTs 971 (1941).
3 This article is concerned only with negligent sole beneficiaries. However,
where such negligent person is not the sole beneficiary, but one of several, the
general view is that he alone is precluded from recovery. His negligence has
no effect on the recovery of the other beneficiaries. See, e.g., Bowler v. Roos,
1955]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tions permit a negligent sole beneficiary to recover in a wrongful death
action.4 However, the great weight of modern authority prohibits
recovery,5 on the ground that the beneficiary's negligence or contribu-
tory negligence bars the action. 6 It has been said that such a recovery
would contravene the well established common-law principle that one
should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong.7 On the other
hand, the courts in jurisdictions allowing recovery base their conclu-
sion on a strict construction of the statute.8 It is reasoned that the
legislature created a new cause of action when it enacted the wrongful
death statute, and set forth the condition upon which the action could
be maintained, namely, that the action must be brought by the per-
sonal representative of one who would have had a good cause of action
had he lived. Since the right to bring the action depends solely on
the right the decedent would have had, the negligence or contributory
negligence of the beneficiary should not bar recovery.9
The New York wrongful death statute' 0 is so construed. Con-
sequently, in cases involving a negligent beneficiary, full recovery is
allowed. 11  The reasoning in Rozewski v. Rozewski,12 in which the
213 Cal. 484, 2 P.2d 817 (1931); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bossert,
44 Ind. App. 245, 87 N.E. 158 (1909); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161
N.W. 715 (1917).
4 See, e.g., McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 208 N.Y. 359, 101 N.E.
885 (1913) ; Bastedo v. Frailey, 109 N.J.L. 390, 162 Atl. 621 (1932) ; Van Clik
v. Hackensack Water Co., 2 N.J. Misc. 1104, 126 At. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
5 See, e.g., Womack v. Preach, 64 Ariz. 61, 165 P.2d 657 (1946); Lenihan
v. Boston & M. R.R., 260 Mass. 28, 156 N.E. 857 (1927) ; Scherer v. Schlaberg,
18 N.D. 421, 122 N.W. 1000 (1909); Matson v. Dane County, 177 Wis. 649,
189 N.W. 154 (1922). See also PROSsFaR, TORTS 970 (1941).
6 See Patania v. Yellow-Checker Cab Co., 102 Cal. App. 600, 283 Pac. 295,
297 (1929); Wise v. Eubanks, 159 So. 161, 163 (La. 1935) ; Jenson v. Glemaker,
195 Minn. 556, 263 N.W. 624, 625-626 (1935) ; Butterfield v. Community Light
& Power Co., 115 Vt. 23, 49 A.2d 415, 416 (1946).
7 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Jerome Hardwood Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 135, 292
S.W. 386, 387 (1927); Willy v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 115 Colo. 306, 172
P.2d 958 (1946). "These maxims [that one should not be allowed to profit
from his own wrong, or his own fraud] are dictated by public policy, have
their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and
have nowhere been superseded by statutes." Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511,
22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889) (emphasis added).
8 See, e.g., McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 208 N.Y. 359, 362-363,
101 N.E. 885, 886 (1913); Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 59 N.J.L. 275,
35 Atl. 899, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1896).9 McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., supra note 8.
10 N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 130-134.
11 See Braun v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 213 N.Y. 655, 107 N.E. 338
(1914) ; Wallace v. D'Aprile, 221 App. Div. 402, 222 N.Y. Supp. 740 (3d Dep't
1927).
2 181 Misc. 793, 46 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1944). But see O'Shea v.
Lehigh Valley R.R., 79 App. Div. 254, 79 N.Y. Supp. 890 (3d Dep't 1903). In
this case a negligent sole beneficiary was denied recovery, the court holding
that the contributory negligence of the beneficiary would bar any recovery on
his part. Although never expressly overruled, the O'Shea case has not been
followed.
[ VOL. 29
RECENT DECISIONS
plaintiff-administrator was the sole beneficiary and the only negligent
party, was that the doctrine prohibiting one from profiting by his own
wrong is inapplicable since it applies only to wilful wrongs in contra-
distinction to negligent wrongs. Consequently, there can be a re-
covery in such a situation. Even in cases where the beneficiary is the
defendant in the action, a recovery may be had. Thus, in Zinman v.
Newnwn 13 the defendant was the husband of the decedent and a statu-
tory beneficiary. His motion to dismiss the complaint was denied, the
court declaring, in effect, that such an action could be maintained
despite the fact that the negligent defendant was the beneficiary.
The New Hampshire view, as stated in Niemi v. Boston & M.
R.R.,1 4 was that no suit could be maintained if the sole beneficiary
caused, or contributed to the death. In the instant case the defen-
dant, a negligent sole beneficiary, relied on the Niemi case in moving
for a dismissal. However, the New Hampshire statute,15 as amended,
provides for deduction, before distribution, of the cost of recovery and
the expenses of administration, burial and last sickness. Prior to the
amendment only the cost of recovery was deductible.Y8 The remainder
of the damages, in which creditors were given no rights, went to the
beneficiaries. 17 The Court in the principal case reasoned that this
amendment was undoubtedly enacted to insure payment to creditors
of these specified expenses since it is expressly provided that they are
to be deducted and paid to the estate, which in turn is liable over to
the creditors. Consequently, the Court held that the action was main-
tainable, recovery being limited, however, to the expenses enumerated
in the statute.
The decision in the instant case established a minor exception to
the New Hampshire rule. Whereas, formerly, no recovery was al-
lowed in cases of this kind, now a limited one is permitted. This
innovation may be challenged on the ground that it indirectly aids the
negligent beneficiary by increasing the size of the estate, and by pro-
viding a fund for the payment of expenses for which the beneficiary
might have been liable in the event the estate proved inadequate.
However, this limited recovery may be justified on the ground that
its primary result is the protection of creditors. Apart from any con-
sideration of the merits of the instant case, the New Hampshire view
seems much more suited to the accomplishment of justice than the
New York position. The New York courts, in permitting recovery,
have chosen not to apply the "profit-from-wrong" maxim.18 The pos-
1351 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 265 App. Div. 998, 39
N.Y.S.2d 999 (1st Dep't 1943).
'1487 N.H. 1, 173 Atl. 361 (1934).
15 N.H. REv. LAws c. 355, § 14 (1942).
16 See Niemi v. Boston & M. R.R., 87 N.H. 1, 173 At. 361, 363 (1934).
17 See Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 587, 146 At. 395, 398 (1929); Davis
v. Herbert, 78 N.H. 179, 97 Atl. 879, 880 (1916).
18 See McKay v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Ry., 208 N.Y. 359, 363, 101 N.E.
885, 886 (1913) ; Lewin v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 52 App. Div. 69, 76-77, 65 N.Y.
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sibility of fraud being perpetrated on insurance companies has been
dismissed with a statement that the presence or absence of insurance
in the case was not "an element to be considered." 19 Similarly, the
fact that such a recovery may run counter to public policy is passed
over with a statement by one court to the effect that public policy is
constantly changing.20 Paradoxically enough, the New York courts
have held that a husband's contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery in an action for damages for the loss of his wife's ser-
vices. 21 No apparent reason exists for permitting recovery in a
wrongful death action while denying it in an action for loss of
services.
22
Inevitably, the conclusion is reached that some legislative action
should be taken in New York to prevent recovery by a negligent
beneficiary. The ideal solution would be an amendment to the wrong-
ful death statute which would codify the result reached in the instant
case. Thus, recovery would be allowed only to the extent of cost of
recovery and the expenses of administration, burial and last sickness.
X
WILLS-EFFECT OF CONTRACT TO MAKE TESTAMENTARY Dis-
POSITION ON WIDOW'S RIGHT OF ELECTION.-Testator entered into a
separation agreement with his first wife, whereby he contracted to
bequeath to her a life income in his entire estate. This agreement
was later incorporated in a divorce decree. The testator then re-
married. In 1952 he died, leaving a will in conformity with the sep-
aration agreement. His second wife thereupon sought to exercise her
right of election pursuant to Section 18 of the New York Decedent
Estate Law. The Surrogate held that a wife could not be deprived
of her statutory share in her husband's estate by a prior contract to
will his estate to another. Matter of Erstein, 205 Misc. 924, 129
N.Y.S.2d 316 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
The question of whether a contract to devise and bequeath an
estate, made by a testator during his lifetime, could be enforced to the
Supp. 49, 53 (4th Dep't 1900), aff'd mere., 165 N.Y. 667, 59 N.E. 301 (1901) ;
Rozewski v. Rozewski, 181 Misc. 793, 796, 46 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
19 See Rozewski v. Rozewski, supra note 18 at 798, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
20 Id. at 797, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
21 Diem v. Adams, 266 App. Div. 307, 42 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1943);
Maxson v. Tomek, 244 App. Div. 604, 280 N.Y. Supp. 319 (4th Dep't), motionfor leave to appeal denied, 268 N.Y. 726 (1935).
22 It could be argued that in an action for loss of services the plaintiff sues
in his own capacity, while in a wrongful death action the plaintiff sues in the
capacity of personal representative. See PROSsER, TORTS 421"422, 957 (1941).
However, this is a purely academic distinction, since the recovery in either
action would inure to the benefit of the negligent party.
[ VOL. 29
